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The recent spate of bank crisis in Nigeria and the instability that accompanied it in 
several banks necessitated the need to find out the underlying cause and proffer 
solutions. This proposed framework is aimed at examining the roles of the risk 
committee in the crisis. The objective is to investigate the relationship between the 
risk management committee and bank stability in Nigeria. The framework presents the 
attributes of the risk management committee that could have impact on bank stability. 
It also presents the agency and resource dependence theories as relevant to the 
investigation. Given that this is a proposed framework, it is subject to review. If it is 
validated, it would contribute towards providing insight into the roles of the risk 
management committee in Nigerian banks and aid policy formulation on risk 
governance.. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Banks occupy an important place in the financial system of every country [7]. They are the links 
between savings and investment given that banks channel funds from depositors to borrowers for 
personal and business purposes [32]. This duty of deposit acceptance and lending for longer term to 
borrowers is called transformation of maturity. Banks facilitate payments and ensure the smooth 
distribution of currency within a country. Thus, through deposit acceptance, lending and facilitating 
the payment system, banks play vital roles in promoting economic activities and ensuring the smooth 
functioning of the economy [7]. Consequently, the health of banks is of paramount interest to 
financial authorities in order to guide against insolvency and instability [12, 54]. 
A bank that is exposed to insolvency is having less cash to pay its obligations as at when due. This 
could arise from the consequences of past decisions on credits that turn delinquent or from 
misconducts usually regarded as moral hazards. Regardless of what precipitates a bank crisis, the 
implications are of wide ramifications for the economy and the individuals [13, 40]. Bank crisis could 
result in sharp reductions in bank credits and drops in investment and growth. Also, bank customers 
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whose demands for cash could not be met may panic and request for their deposits which could lead 
to bank runs with grave consequences even for sound banks [32, 39, 40, 60]. The exposure of other 
banks in the system when one bank or a few banks are facing crisis is what is referred to as contagion 
which is linked to the interconnectedness of the banking system [14, 40, 42, 55].Thus, as a result of 
the economic significance of banks and the far reaching implications of a bank crisis, financial 
regulators closely monitor the banking system to ensure stability [13].  
Confidence in the stability of banks is vital for the smooth running of the financial system and an 
important ingredient for a well-functioning economy [57]. However, for the financial system to be 
reliable and banks in particular to be sound, there is a need for good internal governance [27]. The 
internal governance of corporate organisations and in particular banks has come under the radar of 
scholars and international bodies in recent years [4, 25, 28, 40]. This focus has been more intense 
since the global financial crisis given the connections suggested between the crisis and weak internal 
governance especially risk governance in banks [28, 41]. The increased attention is linked to efforts 
designed to improve the poor internal governance and enhance risk governance with the aim of 
strengthening risk management. 
In several globally systemic important banks, the weak governance contributed to slack and 
ineffective internal checks. Thus, inefficient governance generated poor board and committee 
oversight [28, 40]. Weaknesses in the monitoring of management seems to have given room to poor 
risk management strategies which encouraged excessive risk taking. This poor oversight of 
managerial risk taking decision is widely suggested as a contributory factor to the global financial 
crisis [8].  
Similarly, in Nigeria, boards seem to fail in understanding the roles assigned to them as they 
grappled with the supervision of complex and sophisticated banking firms which are also opaque 
[57]. Boards and their committees’ roles in risk governance as the backbone of effective risk 
management were not properly understood and this prevented the implementation of appropriate 
policies for sound risk oversight and management [40, 49, 56]. Thus, failing to constrain managerial 
risk taking as demanded by their roles, the boards of banks and their committees allowed the 
executives to operate freely and without restraint which generated a rapid growth in risky assets that 
plunged exposed institutions into instability, insolvency and in severe cases the collapse of the 
affected banks.  
In failed institutions, there were signals of poor internal control systems and inefficient risk 
management [28, 40, 50]. There seems to be a lack of effective integration of risk control mechanisms 
coupled with the inability of the boards and their committees to adopt a holistic approach to risk 
management. Internal control resources seem to be inadequate while expertise was lacking in some 
instances [28, 40]. Where expertise exists, the inputs were disregarded to the detriment of the health 
of banks [56]. On the other hand, good internal governance which encompasses sound risk 
governance practices assisted some banks to do better and survived [28]. Banks that performed 
better were found to have emplaced the right risk management strategies, defined their risks with a 
specified risk appetite. Also, the right risk governance framework which established the risk 
management committee (RMC) and recognised the chief risk officer (CRO) and the line of reporting 
to both the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board were duly implemented [2,8 45].  
Thus, it is important to examine the internal governance and risk system failures at the board and 
committee levels in the Nigerian banking system. This risk governance failure is closely connected 
with poor risk oversight and unsound risk management [48, 56]. An investigation into this poorly 
designed risk governance system would provide insight into how to address the detrimental 
outcomes of weak internal governance and poor risk management. One of the measures expected 
to provide strong risk governance in banks is the establishment of a risk management committee 
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(RMC) [9, 27].  This is a committee dedicated to supporting the oversight of the board on all matters 
relating to risks. Complementing this is the dedicated risk function which is usually represented by 
the office of a chief risk officer (CRO). In Nigeria which is the focus of this study, the code of 
governance provided for the establishment of the afore-mentioned structures of risk governance [18-
19]. Despite these provisions, bank instability still continues to plague the Nigerian banking sector.  
Bank instability in Nigeria dates back to the pre-independence period. In that time, banks failed 
in succession due to lack of legal and regulatory provisions to guide banking business and protect the 
stability of institutions [2]. Relative stability was restored after the establishment of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria in 1959 [48]. However, following the deregulation of the economy in 1986 when banking 
license issuance was libralised, there was an upsurge in the number of banks between 1986 and 2000 
[48]. Given the lack of enabling governance and regulatory environment for the large number of 
banks, unethical practices mainly connected with shareholders and boards began to permeate the 
system. Soon, the institutions began to experience insolvency and widespread instability [48]. The 
trend continued to post 2010.  
The instability in the Nigerian banking system seems to be linked to lack of effective credit control 
which resulted in high level of non-performing loans. Connected and insider credits were not 
collaterised [56]. Lending to directors and diversion of bank funds by the chief executive officers 
crippled the banks and instigated a systemic crisis in 2009 from which the Nigerian banking system 
has not fully recovered [56]. Banks’ boards seem to either looked the other way or actively 
participated and aided the actions of the executives [56]. [50] notes that committees of the boards 
failed in the discharge of their duties. For instance, [56] indicates that the RMC could not control bank 
risk taking which resulted in high levels of poor credits. The trend still subsisted in 2016 when the 
board and its committees in one of the systemically important banks were dissolved because of the 
failure of risk governance and management. The affected bank experienced deteriorating capital and 
rising non-performing loans [17]. The central bank concluded that the risk committee seemed to be 
negligent. Given the importance of the RMC in the oversight of credit management to check poor 
lending decisions, the committees seem to have either yielded to pressure or failed to act decisively. 
This study is therefore proposed to examine the roles that the RMC could likely have played in the 
instability experienced in the Nigerian banking system.  
The study is divided into the following sections: the introduction comes up in section I. In sections 
II and III the literature review and research framework are presented while the conclusion is 
contained in section IV. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Bank Stability 
 
Banking system stability is a desirable goal for every economy due to the importance of banks in 
the financial services industry and the far reaching implications of instability in banks [6]. A banking 
system is considered to be stable when over a reasonable period of time it is able to experience 
relative freedom from systemic shocks and disturbances with internal built-in measures that would 
enhance self-correction and prevent crisis [5, 20, 57]. Also, a stable banking system would be required 
to possess sound internal governance [62] without which supervisory actions would be ineffective. 
Thus, when a banking system is stable, the institutions would perform their functions of 
intermediation, credit allocation, and facilitating the payment system without the expectation of 
sudden interruptions [58]. Banking system stability is important for economic growth and 
development [15]. Banks are involved in the payment system; they facilitate the flow of funds from 
savers to borrowers which is a necessary condition for investment [15]. Also, without banks, the 
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conduct of trades at local or global scales would be very challenging if not almost impossible [7, 13]. 
Thus, a stable banking system is vital for a smooth running economy.  
While bank stability is vital, it is also possible for banks to suddenly experience shocks that could 
set instability in motion. Bank instability occurs when a major institution or some banks within a 
country face challenges that create liquidity gaps resulting in their inability to meet payment 
obligations [59]. If the condition is not quickly tackled, it could spread rapidly to other institutions 
and even beyond the borders and create regional or even global instability [55, 59]. This spread of 
crisis from one region to another is the reason why banking crisis is described as contagious. 
Therefore, financial authorities are concerned about the implications of instability in banks and pay 
close attention through supervision and regulation to oversee and ensure sound health for banks [3, 
5, 59].  
 
2.2 The Risk Management Committee (RMC)  
 
The RMC is dedicated to the oversight of risk management and supports the board in ensuring 
effective risk governance. It is responsible for the design of bank risk policy and oversees 
management’s implementation of approved strategies [9]. The committee assists the board in 
considering and recommending the risk appetite and embarks on periodic review of a bank’s risk 
profile. To ensure that risk is well implemented, the committee conducts a periodic check of risk 
management and control framework. The RMC also recommends important policy statements to the 
board that are connected with supervision and regulation. These include vital issues such as loan 
concentration, exposure of banks to large borrowers and provisioning for impairment. For effective 
service, the committee is expected to possess the expertise and skills required for risk management 
at the very high level of an organisation such as banks. It also guides the board in all matters relating 
to risk during board deliberations [9, 35]. 
Studies on the relationship between the RMC and bank stability are few. However, among these 
studies, the available evidence, though mainly from developed economies suggests that the presence 
of a RMC could enhance banking system stability. For example, in a 2008 study by [45], they report 
that only 12 of the 20 largest US banks had RMC before the global financial crisis. A fact they noted 
could have facilitated the crisis. [38] also note that the absence of a RMC in a bank could aid 
instability.  
[42] investigate the risk management committee and its characteristics in their study of selected 
US banks after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Their research focused on the relationship 
between the risk management committee, risk taking and the performance of bank holding 
companies. They report that the number of members on the RMC, the number of meetings and the 
proportion of independent members on the committee have significant and negative relationship 
with risk taking. They also find that the presence of a RMC was negatively and significantly related to 
risk. The results suggest that banks that establish a RMC could control and reduce risk better than 
banks without a RMC. It also indicates that risk control and management would be enhanced with a 
committee that meets regularly, having independent directors where the members are not few. The 
result also shows that the presence of a RMC and all its characteristics have positive and significant 
association with the performance of bank holding companies (BHC). The foregoing indicates that the 
risk management committee could be an important instrument at the disposal of the board to 
restrain management in decisions that could expose banks to risk and instability. It further 
demonstrates that the establishment of a RMC is important for bank risk control and management 
in order to promote stability.   
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Prior studies suggest that the attributes of the RMC such as the size, expertise, meetings, gender 
and independence could play important roles in risk governance and aid bank boards in the oversight 
of managerial decision making [4, 10, 28, 43, 47].Thus, the RMC and the afore mentioned attributes 
demand further exploration to determine the roles they could play in bank stability.  
 
2.3 The RMC Size 
 
The size of a board’s committee is an important determinant of its effectiveness [65]. The size of 
a committee is determined by the number of members appointed to its service but there is no 
consensus on the acceptable size. In countries such as the US and the UK, it ranges from three to five 
or six [25, 53]. Large committees are considered as providing diversity such as gender, expertise and 
other resources [11]. However, a large committee could also create challenges of effective 
coordination and smooth communication.  A smaller committee is likely to have the advantage of 
faster coordination given that the members could be easily consulted but it would also lack the 
additional resources and diversity of a larger committee [47, 65]. However, in the banking sector, 
given the sophisticated and complex nature of banking, a small committee may face some challenges 
in rendering service.  
While studies on the RMC size and bank stability are scanty, there are others which investigated 
the size of the RMC and risk. For instance, [47] in their Malaysian study find a significant and negative 
relationship between the RMC size and risk taking. They concluded that if the RMC could facilitate 
reduction in risks, the committee could be vital towards the attainment of bank stability. Similarly, 
[61] found that the size of the RMC has a negative association with increased risk in the companies 
investigated. Hence, as the committee size increases, it could have more resources to perform its 
functions. This indicates that the resources available through the size of the RMC have the capacity 
to constrain managerial actions that could increase risk. Thus, by checking the risk taking behaviour 
of the executive, more members on the committee would likely contribute to the soundness and 
stability of banks. 
 
2.5 The RMC Expertise 
 
The presence of directors with expertise in accounting, risk management and finance could be 
vital to the effective functioning of the risk management committee [24, 38]. Understanding the 
nature of risks faced by banks is vital for the members of the RMC and to achieve this, they require 
some knowledge of finance and risk [38]. On the other hand, lack of expertise in these fields could 
hinder the members and limit the impact of the committee especially during challenging times [67]. 
Standards and codes such as the Nigerian code of governance specified the necessity for the RMC 
members to possess financial and risk expertise [18-19]. 
In a study conducted by [31], they report a positive and significant impact for the directors who 
have financial expertise than those without it. The finding suggests that expertise in finance and risk 
could assist such members to be more effective since reports and proposals presented at meetings 
would not be difficult for them to understand. Their finding is consistent with the reports of [63] on 
the importance of financial expertise for the members of the RMC. The studies suggest that the 
expertise of the RMC members in risk and financial matters could constrain managerial decisions and 
play important roles in the stability of the banking system. However, financial experts could also align 
with shareholders and favour more risks. [4] indicate that in 2007-2008 during the global financial 
crisis, financial experts did not aid banks to perform better hence they experienced instability. 
Nevertheless, the presence of experts in finance and risk management is considered a vital attribute 
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of the RMC that could support risk management and control. Consequently, national and 
international standards contain provisions for the inclusion of financial experts on the RMC with the 
goal of promoting bank stability [9, 18-19].  
 
2.4 The RMC Meeting  
  
Meeting attendance indicates that committee members are active participants in the activities 
of their groups. It provides them with the opportunity to discuss important issues and advise 
management [64]. In the risk management committee, it gives members the chance to examine 
executive policies on risk management, decide on the bank’s risk appetite and strategies with a view 
towards ensuring sound risk control. [22] in their 2006-2007 study report that attendance at 
meetings has a positive and significant association with firm performance. They suggest that 
frequency of meetings of the RMC could contribute to bank stability as it has the likelihood to afford 
members more time and opportunity to examine proposals critically and guide managerial decisions 
effectively. Similarly, [4] find that in the US, during the global financial crisis, the frequency of 
meetings of the RMC has a significant and positive impact on the stability of banks given that it aided 
the performance of banks that held frequent meetings. Perhaps, the members were able to make 
informed contributions that assisted management to implement better risk control. 
The foregoing studies suggest that an effective RMC would require regular meetings so as to 
spend more time in the oversight of management especially in discussing important issues that could 
have significant implications on bank assets.  On the other hand, the frequency of meetings alone 
may not be adequate to ensure stability in banks. [4] note that attendance should go hand in hand 
with the commitment of members towards committee responsibility especially making informed 
contributions. They argued that the frequency of meeting may not aid a bank to be stable if members 
meet but fail to show dedications to their tasks. Consequently, such meetings may not be productive. 
However, committee meetings still remain the only vital place that members’ voices could be heard 
and far reaching decisions taken that would promote stability in banks. 
 
2.5 The RMC Gender  
 
The gender of a committee is the proportion of the female members to total committee 
membership [44, 60]. The literature argue that female committee members could likely serve as 
complimentary device for governance control [1]. [16] indicated that the inclusion of more female 
members on corporate boards and committees has gained attention in recent times. This seems to 
stem from the argument that more female membership represents increased diversity and this is 
likely to contribute more resources and lead to better decisions [33]. Gender differences could be 
observed in communications, decision making and style of leadership [37, 58]. This difference 
between the genders could translate to more robust decisions on risk management. [44] contend 
that female involvement in corporate affairs is not just a means to an end, but an important element 
in that such participation would not only engender equity but provide a different perspective during 
discussions. Thus, diversity could be beneficial to the RMC.  
Women seem to have behavioural differences compared with men as it is observed that females 
prefer less risk to males [23, 33, 46]. Men are also more likely than women to take extreme risks [66]. 
Women who serve as executives issue less debts than their men counterparts. Therefore, the female 
members of the RMC could serve as counter force to their male members. Hence, the female 
members of the RMC could serve as more effective checks on executive risk taking and thereby 
enhance bank stability. Therefore, given that the presence of female members on the RMC could 
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contribute to less risk taking, it is expected to ensure better quality of assets and consequently 
promote the stability of banks. Nevertheless, diverse groups also could bring challenges and strives 
as a result of conflicts from differences in opinions and prolong decision making with detrimental 
consequences [21].  
 
2.6 The RMC Independence  
 
The effective functioning of board committees is dependent on their composition [51]. If the 
committee is composed of more independent directors, there is a likelihood that members could be  
more effective in the oversight of management. This is because where the executive are unable to 
influence independent board and committee members, the directors tend to perform better [4, 61]. 
Independent members would likely have the capacity to scrutinize executive proposals more 
objectively because of less pressure from management [29]. Consequently, they could demand for 
vital information necessary for the review of managerial presentations. The enhanced oversight 
could produce better decisions on policies and strategies and contribute to stability. Moreover, the 
independent members usually strive to protect their reputations which necessitate that they provide 
more effective monitoring [29]. Their reputation is enhanced when the banks in which they serve 
remain stable. During the global financial crisis, financial service companies with lower number of 
independent directors on their RMC were found to exhibit weaker performance than others with 
more independent directors. Hence, the presence of independent directors on the RMC could 
promote improved value and ensure the stability of banks [67].  In a 2014 study by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) with samples from multiple countries, it reports that independent directors 
have negative relationship with risk taking in banks [36]. Therefore, banks with more independent 
members seem to experience less risk and better performance. It suggests that there is likelihood 
that banks with independent directors on the RMC would be more stable in that they seem to have 
monitoring advantage over the management.   
 
3. Proposed Theoretical Framework 
 
The theories proposed for this study are the agency and resource dependence theories. Agency 
theory suggests that the board of directors could serve as a device for the control of management 
with the aim of reducing the agency problems between the managers and owners [26,30]. In 
performing this function, the board sets up committees which includes the RMC. Thus, the RMC 
supports the board in its oversight to reduce agency costs and ensure the alignment of bank owners 
with the management [25, 26]. The resource dependence theory, on the other hand focused on the 
availability of necessary resources for the functioning of the board [34,52]. These resources include 
the diversity of board members, their expertise, experience and education. Thus, the theory is 
relevant in discussing the diversity of the RMC.  
Figure 1 shows the proposed framework which depicts the relationship between the risk 
management committee and bank stability. It indicates that the risk management committee has 
direct relationship with bank stability. This suggests that the committee has the potential to influence 
the stability of banks. The RMC is one of the important committees of the board recommended by 
the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision for the control of bank risk in order to ensure stability of 
banks. Prior studies argued that adequate attention has not been paid to the investigation of the 
RMC  particularly,  the role of the audit committee [60]. This suggests the need for further studies on 
the attributes of the RMC especially in relation to bank stability [38, 61]. This study aims to test this 
relationship.  
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Fig. 1. The Conceptual Framework 
4. Conclusion 
This is a proposed research on the relationship between the risk management committee and 
bank stability in Nigeria. When the study is implemented, it is expected to provide empirical evidence 
on the relationship between the RMC and bank stability in Nigeria. The outcome is to yield policy 
suggestions on how to improve the stability of the Nigerian banking system. It is expected to reveal 
the extent to which the RMC could enhance the stability of banks and to further show if there are 
steps that could be taken to aid the effectiveness of the RMC in banks. Bank stability is fundamental 
to economic stability. If banks are unstable, nations will face unpredictable economic conditions with 
severe implications for growth, employment and overall development. However, if board 
committees such as the RMC functions well, they could contribute to risk reduction which is usually 
at the root of most instability in banks. The outcome of the study is expected to be useful for reforms 
of the RMC and to aid policy formulation on risk governance in banks.  
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